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Abstract. Motivated by the common academic problem of allocating papers to
referees for conference reviewing we propose a novel mechanism for solving the
assignment problem when we have a two sided matching problem with prefer-
ences from one side (the agents/reviewers) over the other side (the objects/papers)
and both sides have capacity constraints. The assignment problem is a fundamen-
tal problem in both computer science and economics with application in many
areas including task and resource allocation. We draw inspiration from multi-
criteria decision making and voting and use order weighted averages (OWAs)
to propose a novel and flexible class of algorithms for the assignment problem.
We show an algorithm for finding an Σ -OWA assignment in polynomial time, in
contrast to the NP-hardness of finding an egalitarian assignment. Inspired by this
setting we observe an interesting connection between our model and the classic
proportional multi-winner election problem in social choice.
1 Introduction
Assigning indivisible items to multiple agents is a fundamental problem in many fields
including computer science, economics and operations research. Algorithms for match-
ing and assignment are used in a variety of application areas including allocating run-
ways to airplanes, residents to hospitals, kidneys to patients [15], students to schools
[10], assets to individuals in a divorce, jobs to machines, and tasks to cloud computing
nodes [26]. Understanding the properties of the underlying algorithms is an important
aspect to ensuring that all participating agents are happy with their allocations and do
not attempt to misrepresent their preferences; a key area of study for computational
social choice [9].
An area that is near to many academics’ hearts is the problem of allocating papers
to referees for peer review. The results of grant, journal, and conference reviewing can
have significant impact on the careers of scientists. Ensuring that papers and proposals
are reviewed by the most qualified/interested referees most is part of ensuring that items
are treated properly and all participants support the outcome of the processes. Making
ar
X
iv
:1
70
5.
06
84
0v
1 
 [c
s.A
I] 
 19
 M
ay
 20
17
sure these processes work for both the proposers and the reviewers is important and
methods for improving peer review have been proposed and discussed in AI [29] and
broadly across the sciences [28].
There are a number of ways one can improve the quality of peer review [29]. First is
to ensure that reviewers are not incentivized to misreport their reviews for personal gain.
Along this line there has been significant interest recently in strategyproof mechanisms
for peer review [6]. Unfortunately, the method that we discuss in this paper is not strat-
egyproof. Another way is to ensure that reviewers are competent to provide judgements
on the papers they are assigned. The Toronto Paper Matching System [11] is designed
to improve the process from this paper-centric model. A third alternative, and the one
we focus on in this study, is ensuring that reviewers are happy with the papers they are
asked to review. This is fundamentally a question about the optimization objectives of
the assignment functions used.
Formally, we study the Conference Paper Assignment Problem (CPAP) [22] which
is a special of the Multi-Agent Resource Allocation Problem (MARA) [7], and propose
a novel assignment, the Σ -OWA assignment. In the CPAP setting we have a two-sided
market where on one side the agents/reviewers have preferences over the other side,
the objects/papers, and both sides have (possibly infinite) upper and lower capacities.
A fundamental tension in assignment settings is the tradeoff between maximizing the
social welfare, also know as the utilitarian maximal assignment and the Rawlsian [30]
fairness concept of maximizing the utility of the worst off agent, known as the egali-
tarian maximal assignment. These two ideas are incompatible optimization objectives
and diverge in a computational sense as well: computing the utilitarian assignment for
additive utilities can be done in polynomial time, while computing the egalitarian as-
signment is NP-complete [14]. This, perhaps, could be the reason that implementers of
large conference paper assignment software often opt for utilitarian assignments, as is
supposedly the case for EasyChair [19].4 However, it is also not clear if an egalitarian
assignment is desirable for CPAP.
Contributions. We establish a motivation for using OWA vectors in the assignment set-
ting and define a novel notion of allocation, the Σ -OWA assignment. We give algorithm
to compute an Σ -OWA maximal assignment in polynomial time and we show that the Σ -
OWA objective generalizes the utilitarian objective. We show that Σ -OWA assignments
satisfy a notion of Pareto optimality w.r.t. the pairwise comparisons of the objects by the
agents. We implement an algorithm for Σ -OWA assignments and perform experiments
on real world conference paper assignment data.
2 Preliminaries
From here we will use the more general notation agents/objects to describe our setting.
In assignment settings each agent provides their preference over the objects as a reflex-
ive, complete, and transitive preference relation (weak order) over the set of objects,%i.
4 This is technically unsubstantiated as when the authors contacted EasyChair to understand the
assignment process we were told, “We do not provide information on how paper assignment
in EasyChair is implemented. The information in Garg et.al. may be incorrect or out of date -
none of the authors worked for EasyChair, they also had no access to the EasyChair code.”
We do not assume that%i is complete; it is possible that some agents may have conflicts
of interest or have no preference for a particular object; this assumption is often called
“having unacceptable objects” in the literature [26].
In many real-world CPAP settings there are a fixed number of equivalence classes
into which agents are asked to place the objects [27]. We assume that the number of
equivalence classes (ranks) of objects are given as input to the problem and agents
tell us within which rank each objects belong. Agents also provide a decreasing utility
value for each rank5. Our main result can be extended to the case where the number of
equivalence classes is not fixed.
Formally, the CPAP problem is defined by (N,O,%,u,∆): a set of n agents N =
{a1, . . . ,an}; a set of m objects O= {o1, . . . ,om}; for each i ∈ N, a reflexive and transi-
tive preference relation (weak order) over the set of objects, %i, divided into ∆ equiva-
lence classes (ranks); and for each i ∈ N a utility vector ui is of length ∆ and assigns a
decreasing utility ui(k)→ R for each k ∈ [1,∆ ], i.e., ui(1) > ui(2) > .. . > ui(∆). Let
ri( j) be the rank of object j for i and ui(ri( j)) denote the value of i for j.
2.1 Side Constraints and Feasible Assignments
There are two practical constraints that we include in our model, making our model
more general than the standard MARA or CPAP problems studied in computer science
[7]: upper and lower capacities on both the agents and objects.
Agent Capacity: each agent i ∈ N has (possibly all equal) upper and lower bound
on their capacity, the number of objects they can be allocated, cNmin(i) and c
N
max(i).
Object Capacity: each object j ∈ O has a (possibly all equal) upper and lower
bound on the number of agents assigned to it, cOmin( j) and c
O
max( j), respectively.
We can now define a feasible assignment A for an instance (N,O,,u,∆). For a
given assignment A, let A(i, :) denote the set of objects assigned to agent i in A, let
A(:, j) denote the set of agents assigned to object j, and let | · | denote the size (number
of elements) of a set or vector. A feasible assignment A must obey:
[∀i ∈ N : cNmin(i)≤ |A(i, :)| ≤ cNmax(i)]∧ [∀ j ∈ O : cOmin( j)≤ |A(:, j)| ≤ cOmax( j)].
We write the set of all feasible assignments for an instance as A(N,O,,u,∆).6
2.2 Individual Agent Evaluation
We first formalize how an individual agent evaluates their assigned objects. Each fea-
sible assignment A ∈ A gives rise to a signature vector for each agent i ∈ N; intu-
itively the signature vector is the number of objects at each rank assigned to i. For-
mally let σ i(A) = (σ i,1(A), . . . ,σ i,∆ (A)) where σ i,l(A) = |{ j ∈ A(i, :)|ri( j) = l}| for
each l ∈ [1, . . . ,∆ ].
5 We assume that agents can give any utilities as input. However, often the utilities are restricted
to be the same, i.e., Borda utilities in conference paper bidding, or come from some fixed
budget, i.e., bidding fake currency as in course allocation at Harvard [10].
6 We will omit the arguments when they are clear from context.
For indivisible (discrete) objects the lexicographic relation can be modeled by the
additive utility relation by setting the agent utilities to high enough values. Formally,
if the utility for rank i < j is u(i) > u( j) ·m then the lexicographic and additive utility
relations are the same, i.e., no matter how many additional objects of rank j the agent
receives, one additional object of rank i is more preferred. We now define the relations
that a referee might consider between assignments A and B.
Lexicographic: An agent i lexicographically prefers A to B if σ i(A) comes before
σ i(B) in the lexicographic order. That is, there is an index 1 ≥ l ≥ ∆ such that for all
k > l we have σ i,k(A) = σ i,k(B) and σ i,l(A)> σ i,l(B); i.e., i receives at least one more
paper of a higher rank in A than in B. The lexicographic relation over vectors has a long
history in the assignment literature [18].
Additive Utility: An agent i prefers assignment A to B if he has more additive utility
for the objects assigned to him in A than in B. Formally, (and slightly abusing notation)
ui(A) = ∑ j∈A(i,:)ui(ri( j)) > ∑ j∈B(i,:)ui(ri( j)), or an alternative formulation using the
dot product, ui(A) = ui ·σ i(A)> ui ·σ i(B).
2.3 Overall Assignment Evaluation
In the literature there are several optimization objectives defined over an assignment
that an implementer may wish to consider. We limit our discussion to the two classical
notions below. Additional discussion of objectives, including the imposition of various
fairness criteria for the CPAP setting can be found in Garg et al. [19] and for the MARA
setting see e.g., Bouveret and Lemaıˆtre [8].
Utilitarian Social Welfare Maximal Assignment: Often called the utilitarian as-
signment, we want to maximize the total social welfare over all the agents. An assign-
ment is a utilitarian assignment if it satisfies:
argmax
A∈A ∑i∈N ∑j∈A(i,:)
ui(ri( j)) = argmax
A∈A ∑i∈N
ui ·σ i(A).
Egalitarian Social Welfare Maximal Assignment: Often called the egalitarian as-
signment, we want to enforce the Rawlsian notion of fairness by making sure that the
worst off referee is as happy as possible, i.e., maximize the utility of the least well off
agent. Formally,
argmax
A∈A
min
i∈N ∑
j∈A(i,:)
ui(ri( j)) = argmax
A∈A
min
i∈N
ui ·σ i(A).
In the discrete MARA and CPAP setting where objects are not divisible, the prob-
lem of finding an egalitarian assignment is NP-hard [14] while finding a utilitarian
assignment can be done in polynomial time [7].
3 Background and Related Work
One and two sided matching and assignment problems have been studied in economics
[31] and computer science [26, 9] for over 40 years. Matching and assignment have
many applications including kidneys exchanges [15] and school choice [1]. Our prob-
lem is often called the multi-agent resource allocation (MARA) problem in computer
science [7] The papers to referees formulation of this problem has some additional side
constraints common in the economics literature, but not as common in computer sci-
ence [26]. In the economics literature the Workers-Firms problem is the most closely
related analogue to our problem, modeling many-many matchings with capacities [24].
The conference paper assignment has been studied a number of times over the years
in computer science [22], as has defining and refining notions of fairness for the assign-
ment vectors in multi-agent allocation problems [20]. We build off the work of Garg
et al. [19], who extensively study the notion of fair paper assignments, including lexi-
min and rank-maximal assignments, within the context of conference paper assignment.
Garg et al. [19] show that for the setting we study, finding an egalitarian optimal assign-
ment and finding a leximin optimal assignment are both NP-hard when there are three
or more equivalence classes; and polynomial time computable when there are only two.
They also provide an approximation algorithm for leximin optimal assignments. We
know that if the capacity constraints are hard values, i.e., each reviewer must review
≤ x papers and each paper must receive exactly y reviews, then the resulting version of
capacitated assignment is NP-hard [25]. Answer set programming for CPAP was stud-
ied by Amendola et al. [3]; they encode the CPAP problem in ASP and show that finding
a solution that roughly correspond to the leximin optimal and egalitarian solutions can
be done in reasonable time for large settings (≈ 100 agents).
CPAP also receives considerable attention in the recommender systems [13] and
machine learning [12] communities. Often though, this work takes the approach of
attempting to infer a more refined utility or preference model in order to distinguish
papers. Fairness and efficiency concerns are secondary. A prime example of this is the
Toronto Paper Matching System designed by Charlin and Zemel [11]. This system at-
tempts to increase the accuracy of the matching algorithms by having the papers express
preferences over the reviewers themselves; where these preferences are inferred from
the contents of the papers.
We make use of Order weighted averages (OWAs), often employed in multi-criteria
decision making [33]. OWAs have recently received attention in computational social
choice for voting and ranking [21], finding a collective set of items for a group [32],
and multi-winner voting with proportional representation [17, 16]. The key difference
between CPAP and voting using OWAs in the ComSoc literature is that CPAP does
not select a set of winners that all agents will share. Instead, all agents are allocated a
possibly disjoint set of objects.
4 Σ -OWA Assignments
We now formally define OWAs and their use for defining assignment objectives. We
will discuss alternative formulations of Σ -OWA which have been studied.
An order weighted average (OWA) is a function defined for an integer K as a vector
α(K) = (α1, . . . ,αK) of K non-negative numbers. Let x = (x1, . . . ,xK) be a vector of K
numbers and let x↓ be the non-increasing rearrangement of x, i.e. x↓ = x↓1 ≥ x↓2 ≥ . . .≥
x↓K . Then we say:
OWAα(x) = α ·x↓ =
K
∑
i=1
αi ·x↓i .
In order to apply OWAs to our setting we need to define the weighted rank signature
of an assignment. Let ω i(A) be defined as the sorted vector of utility that a referee gets
from an assignment A. Formally,
ω i(A) = sort({∀ j ∈ A(i, :) : ui(r( j))}).
For example, if A(i, :) included two objects with utility 3, one of utility 1, and one of
utility 0, we would have
ω i(A) = (3,3,1,0).
Our inspiration for applying OWAs comes from a multi-winner voting rule known
as Proportional Approval Voting (PAV) [23, 5, 4]. In approval voting settings, each
agent can approve of as many candidates as they wish. Under the standard approval
voting (AV) method, all approvals from each agent assign one point to the candidate
for which they are cast. However, this can lead to a number of pathologies described by
Aziz et al. [5] and it intuitively does not seem fair; once a candidate that you like has
been selected to the winning set your next candidate selected to the winning set should
seemingly count less. Hence in PAV, which is designed to be more fair [4], a voter’s
first approval counts for a full point, the second for 1/2, the next for 1/3, and on as a
harmonically decreasing sequence.
Transitioning this logic to the CPAP setting, we were motivated to find a way to
distribute objects to agents that increases the number of agents who receive their top
ranked objects. This is the logic of PAV: once you get a candidate into the winning
set, you should count less until everyone else has a candidate in the winning set. If
we desire to directly get a rank maximal assignment, completely ignoring the utilities,
then we know this is polynomial by a result from Garg et al. [19]. However, if we wish
to modulate between using the utilities and using only the ranks, perhaps we can use
OWAs. We use the sum over all agents of OWAα(ω) = α ·ω as the optimization criteria
for the assignment.
In order to cleanly define this we need to place some restrictions on our OWA vec-
tors. Firstly, the length of α needs to be at least as long as the maximum agent capacity,
i.e., |α| ≥ argmaxi∈N(cNmax(i)). Typically the literature on OWAs assumes that α is nor-
malized, i.e., ∑1≤i≤K αi = 1. We do not enforce this convention as we wish to study
the PAV setting with α = (1,1/2, . . .). This is formally a relaxation and we observe that
whether or not the OWAs are normalized does not affect our computational results.
However, we do require that our OWA vector be non-increasing and that each entry be
≥ 0, i.e., for any i, j ∈ |α|, i< j we have α i ≥ α j ≥ 0.
Σ -OWA ASSIGNMENT
Input: Given an assignment setting (N,O,,u,∆) with agent ca-
pacities [cNmin(i),c
N
max(i)] for all i ∈ N, and object capacities
[cOmin( j),c
O
max( j)] for all j ∈ O, and a non-increasing OWA vec-
tor α i with |α| ≥max∀i∈N(cNmax(i)).
Question: Find a feasible assignment A such that
A= argmax
A∈A
|n|
∑
i=1
α i ·ω i(A).
In our formulation, the OWA operator is applied to the vector of agent utilities and
then we aggregate (or sum) these modified utilities to give the assignment objective.
Hence, the Σ -OWA name. We observe that this formulation strictly generalizes the util-
itarian assignment objective; if we set α = (1)n we recover the utilitarian assignment.
One may also wish to consider applying the OWA over the sorted vector of total
agent utility for their allocation, which one could call the OWA-Σ version of our prob-
lem. Indeed, this formulation of the problem has been considered before and proposed
in the earliest writings on OWAs for decision making [33]. Taking the OWA-Σ formu-
lation allows one to recover both the utilitarian assignment, α = (1/n, . . . ,1/n), as well as
the egalitarian assignment, α = (0, . . . ,0n−1,1). However, because the OWA-Σ formu-
lation is a generalization of the egalitarian assignment, it becomes NP-hard in general
[14].
We think of the α vector as a kind of control knob given to the implementer of the
market, allowing them to apply a sub-linear transform to the agent utilities. This abil-
ity may be especially useful when agents are free to report their (normalized) utilities
for ranks via bidding or other mechanisms [10]. In many settings the utility vector is
controlled by the individual agents, while the OWA vector is under the control of the
market implementers. Consider the following example.
Example 1. Consider a setting with four agents N = {a1,a2,a3,a4} agents and four
objects O = {o1,o2,o3,o4}. For all agents let cNmin = cNmax = 2 and for all objects let
cOmin = c
O
max = 2. For the Σ -OWA assignment, let α = (1,1/2).
o1 o2 o3 o4
a1 11 9 0 0
a2 8 8 2 2
a3 7 7 3 3
a4 6 6 4 4
We get the following allocations.
Utilitarian:
A(a1, :) = {o1,o2},u1(A) = 20; A(a2, :) = {o1,o2},u2(A) = 16;
A(a3, :) = {o3,o4},u3(A) = 6; A(a4, :) = {o3,o4},u4(A) = 8;
∑i ui(A) = 50.
OWA, α = (1,1/2):
A(a1, :) = {o1,o2},u1(A) = 20, α ·ω1 = 15.5;
A(a2, :) = {o2,o3},u2(A) = 10, α ·ω2 = 9.0;
A(a3, :) = {o1,o4},u3(A) = 10, α ·ω3 = 8.5;
A(a4, :) = {o3,o4},u4(A) = 8, α ·ω4 = 5.0;
∑i ui(A) = 48.
Egalitarian:
A(a1, :) = {o1,o4},u1(A) = 11; A(a2, :) = {o2,o4},u2(A) = 10;
A(a3, :) = {o2,o3},u3(A) = 10; A(a4, :) = {o1,o3},u4(A) = 10;
∑i ui(A) = 41.
Inspecting the results of Example 1, we observe that in the set of all utilitarian
maximal assignments have a1 and a2 each being assigned to o1 and o2, in the set of
all Σ -OWA maximal assignments a3 is assigned one of o1 or o2 while a2 is assigned
one of o3 or o4, while in the set of all egalitarian maximal assignments each of the
agents receives one of either o1 or o2 along with one of o3 or o4. Thus we observe the
following.
Observation 1 The set of assignments returned by each of the three objective functions,
utilitarian, egalitarian, and OWA, can be disjoint.
There are instances where the set of Σ -OWA assignments is the same as the set of
egalitarian assignments, but disjoint from the set of utilitarian assignments. Hence, it is
an interesting direction for future work to fully characterize Σ -OWA assignments and
discover OWA vectors with nice properties.
4.1 Pareto Optimality
An allocation S is more preferred by a given agent with respect to pairwise comparisons
than allocation T if S is a result of replacing an item in T with a strictly more preferred
item. Note that the pairwise comparison relation is transitive. An allocation is Pareto
optimal with respect to pairwise comparisons if there exists no other allocation that
each agent weakly prefers and at least one agent strictly prefers.
Lemma 1. Consider an agent i and two allocations S and T of equal size. Then if S is
at least as preferred as T by i with respect to pairwise comparison, then S yields at least
as much OWA value as T for any OWA vector no matter if it is increasing or decreasing.
Proof. Note that S can be viewed as a transformation from T where each item j is
replaced by some other item j′ that is at least as preferred. Hence, the value of the item
either stays the same or increases. In either case, the corresponding OWA multiplied
with the value is the same. Since the OWA transform is bilinear, the total OWA score of
S is at least as much as that of T .
Proposition 1. The Σ -OWA maximal assignment is Pareto optimal with respect to pair-
wise comparison irrespective of the OWA.
Proof. Assume for contradiction that a Σ -OWA maximal assignment A is not Pareto
optimal with respect to pairwise comparisons. From Lemma 1, there exists another
outcome A′ that each agent weakly prefers and at least one agent strictly prefers. But
this means that in A′ each agent gets at least as much OWA score and at least one agent
gets strictly more. But this contradicts the fact that A is OWA maximal.
5 An Algorithm for Σ -OWA assignments
We give an algorithm for finding Σ -OWA assignments using flow networks. In this
proof we use the most general formulation of our problem by allowing the values of the
upper and lower per-agent capacities, [cNmin(i),c
N
max(i)], to vary for each agent; and the
upper and lower object capacities, [cOmin( j),c
O
max( j)], to vary for each object.
Theorem 2. An Σ -OWA assignment can be found in polynomial time.
Proof. We reduce our problem to the problem of finding a minimum cost feasible flow
in a graph with upper and lower capacities on the edges, which is a polynomial time
solvable problem. In addition to being polynomial time solvable, we know that the flow
is integral as long as all edge capacities are integral, even if we have real valued costs
[2]. Figures 1 and 2 provide a high level view of the flow network that we will construct.
N O
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C = [cOmin(3),c
O
max(3)]
C = [cOmin(m),c
O
max(m)]
Fig. 1. Main gadget for the reduction which enforces the agent and object capacity constraints.
In Figure 1 we first build a tripartite graph with two sets of nodes and one set of
gadgets per agent: the agent nodes, one for each agent ai; the agent gadgets, one (il-
lustrated in Figure 2) for each agent ai; and the object nodes, one for each object o j.
There is an edge from the source node s to each of the agent nodes, each with cost 0,
minimum flow capacity cNmin(i) and a maximum flow capacity c
N
max(i). This set of edges
and nodes enforces the constraint that each ai has capacity [cNmin(i),c
N
max(i)]. We also
construct an edge from each object node to the sink t. Each of these edges has a cost
0, a minimum capacity cOmin( j), and a maximum capacity c
O
max( j). This set of edges
enforces the constraint that each o j has capacity [cOmin( j),c
O
max( j)].
We now turn to the agent gadget depicted in Figure 2 for arbitrary ai. The leftmost
node and the rightmost set of nodes in Figure 2 correspond to the agent nodes N and
N O
ai
α1
α2
αd
o1α1
o2α1
o3α1
omα1
o1αd
o2αd
o3αd
omαd
aio1
aio2
aio3
aiom
o1
o2
o3
om
w=
−u i
(o 1
) ·α 1
w=
−u i(o2
) ·α1
w=−ui(o3) ·α1
w=−ui(om) ·α1
w=
−u i(
o1)
·αd
w=−ui(
o2) ·αd
w=−ui(o3) ·αd
w=−ui (om ) ·αD
Fig. 2. The per agent gadget. Note that all costs on edges are 0 and all capacities are [0,1] unless
otherwise noted.
object nodes O in Figure 1, respectively. In each agent gadget we create a tripartite sub-
graph with the agent node ai serving as the source and the set of object nodes O serving
as the sinks.
We create three layers of nodes which we describe in turn from left to right. First, we
create a set of decision nodes with labels α1, . . . ,αd where cNmax(i)≤ d≤ |α|. Intuitively,
we will be multiplying the OWA value α1 by the utility for some object, so we need to
keep track of all the values that could result. The arcs from ai to each of the nodes
in this set has upper capacity 1, minimum capacity 0, and cost 0. If we have the case
that cNmax(i)< d then we can set the maximum capacity of the edges to node(s) α j, j >
cNmax(i) to 0. This enforces that each value in the OWA vector can modify at most one
utility value.
For each of the decision nodes α1, . . . ,αd constructed, we create a set of ob-
ject/decision nodes for each o j which we denote o jαk. From each of the decision nodes
α1, . . . ,αd we create an edge to each of the object/decision nodes created for this par-
ticular decision node αk, i.e., o1α1,o2α1, . . . ,omα1 for α1. Each of these edges has
maximum capacity 1 and a cost equal to −1 · ui(o j) ·α1 for rank 1 and object o j ∈ O.
These costs are the (negative) cost that matching agent ai with object o j at weighted
rank dk contributes to the OWA objective.
Finally, we create one set of agent/object nodes, one for each o j denoted aio j. From
all the object/decision nodes we connect all nodes with a label of o j to the corresponding
agent/paper node, i.e., o1α1,o1α2, . . .o1αd all connect to aio1 with cost 0 and maximum
capacity 1. We then connect the agent/object node to the corresponding object node in
the main construction from O, i.e., aio1 to o1 with cost 0 and maximum capacity 1. This
set of nodes and edges enforces that each agent can be assigned each object once.
We can extract an assignment from the minimum cost feasible flow by observing
that paper o j is allocated to agent ai if and only if there is a unit of flow passing from the
particular agent/object node aio j to the object node o j. We now argue for the correct-
ness of our algorithm in two steps, (1) that all constraints for the Σ -OWA assignment
problem are enforced and (2) that a minimum cost feasible flow in the constructed
graph gives an Σ -OWA assignment. For (1) we note that since the units of flow across
the graph represent the assignment and we have explained how the capacity constraints
on all edges enforce each of the particular constraints imposed by our definition of a
feasible assignment, there is a feasible flow iff the flow satisfies the constraints.
For (2) observe that for each agent, the α nodes fill with flow in order from α1 to
αd as the OWA vector is non-increasing and the utilities are decreasing, i.e., for each
agent, the edge costs monotonically increase from the edges associated with α1 to the
edges associated with αd . Thus, for each agent, the first unit of flow to this agent will
use the least cost (most negative) edge must be associated with α1; and similarly for
α2 through αd . From the capacity constraints we know there is only one unit of flow
that enters each decision node αi and there is only one unit of flow that can leave each
agent/paper node aio j. This means that each αi can modify only one o j and each o j
selected must be unique for this agent.
As the decision nodes are filled in order and αi can only modify the value for a
single object, we know the total cost of the flow across the agent gadget for each ai is
equal to −1 ·α i ·ω i. Hence, the price of the min cost flow across all agents is equal to
−1 ·∑∀i∈N α i ·ω i(A). Thus, the min cost flow in the graph is an Σ -OWA assignment.
5.1 Generalizations
We observe two possible generalizations of the above construction which allow us to
use this constructive proof for more general instances than the CPAP. First, The proof
above can be generalized to allow for α to vary for each agent. Specifically, observe that
the decision nodes for each agent ai are independent from all other agents. This means
that, for each agent (or a class of agents) we could use an OWA vector αai . This ability
may be useful, for instance, when a group of agents reports the same extreme utility
distribution and the organizer wishes to apply the same transform to these utilities.
The second generalization that we can make to the above construction is to allow
each agent to be assigned to each object more than once. While this ability does not
make sense in the reviewers/papers setting (unless there are sub reviewers) there could
be other capacitated assignment settings where we may wish to assign the agents to
objects multiple times e.g., if there are discrete jobs that need to be done a certain
number of times but and a single agent can be assigned the same job multiple times.
In order to generalize the capacity constraint from 1 for each agent i for each object
j we introduce a capacity upper bound zi, j which encodes the number of times that
agent i can be assigned to object j. Taking zi, j = 1 for all i and j gives us the original
CPAP setting. In order to enforce this constraint, within each agent gadget (Figure 2)
we add a capacity constraint equal to zi, j from each edge aio j to o j. If we want a lower
bound for the number of copies of o j assigned to ai we can encode this lower bound on
this edge as well.
We can extract an assignment from the minimum cost feasible flow by observing
that paper o j is allocated to agent ai zi j times if and only if there are units of flow
passing from the particular agent/object node aio j to the object node o j. The argument
for correctness follows exactly from the proof of Theorem 2 above.
Corollary 1. An Σ -OWA assignment can be found in polynomial time even if each
agent ai has a unique OWA vector αai and each object o j can be assigned to each
agent ai any number of times (not just once).
6 Experiments
We now turn to the question of how good are Σ -OWA assignments in practice? We
answer this question using real world data from three large international conferences
(MD-00002-00000001 – 00000003) from WWW.PREFLIB.ORG [27]. We focus discus-
sion on MD-00002-00000003 which has 146 agents and 175 objects. We implemented
the algorithm given in Section 5 using networkX for Python and Lemon for C++. How-
ever, we still have a run time≈O(V 4), giving runtime≈ (1502 ·3)4) = 2×1019, which
caused our computers to crash even with 16GB of memory. This was quite disappoint-
ing as we thought the flow argument could be used to solve this problem on real-world
instances.
Not to be deterred, we still wanted to investigate the assignments we get from Σ -
OWA compare to the utilitarian and egalitarian assignments. Consequently, we imple-
mented the model as an MIP in Gurobi 7.0 and it ran in under 1 minute for all instances
and settings using 4 cores. Our MIP is similar to the one given by Skowron et al. [32]
and the MARA MIP by Bouveret et al. [7]. However, as we have capacity constraints
and individual/variable length OWAs, our MIP is more general than either.
To encode the Σ -OWA problem we introduce a binary variable xa,o indicating that
agent a is assigned object o. We introduce a real valued variable uowa,a which is the
Σ -OWA utility for agent a. Finally, we introduce ra,o,p for the OWA matrix which notes
that agent a is assigned object o at OWA rank p. The MIP is given below.
max ∑a∈A∑o∈O,p∈P ua(o) ·αp · ra,o,p Description:
s.t. cOmin(o)≤ ∑a∈A xa,o ≤ cOmax(o) ∀o ∈ O (1) Object Capacities
cNmin(a)≤ ∑o∈O xa,o ≤ cNmax(a) ∀a ∈ A (2) Agent Capacities
∑p∈P ra,o,p ≤ 1 ∀a ∈ A,∀o ∈ O (3) One Object per OWA Rank
∑o∈O ra,o,p ≤ 1 ∀a ∈ A,∀p ∈ P (4) Objects Have One Rank
∑p∈P ra,o,p ≥ xa,o ∀a ∈ A,∀o ∈ O (5) Assignment to OWA Link Fcn.
∑o∈O ra,o,p ≥ ∑o∈O ra,o,p+1 ∀a ∈ A,∀p ∈ P (6) Ranks Fill in Increasing Order
∑o∈O ra,o,p ·ua(o)≥ ∑o∈O ra,o,p+1 ·ua(o) ∀a ∈ A,∀p ∈ P (7) Agent Utility Must Be Decreasing
Constraints (1)–(4) enforce the cardinality constraints on the agents, objects, and
OWA rank matrix. Constraint (5) links the agent and object assignments to be positions
in the OWA rank matrix. Line (6) enforces that the rank matrix fills from the first posi-
tion to the cNmax position for each agent. And finally (7) enforces that the Σ -OWA value
of the assignment positions in the rank matrix must be decreasing. We then maximize
the sum over all agents of the OWA objective value.
We found the utilitarian, egalitarian, and Σ -OWA assignments for each of the real
world datasets when each object must receive 3–4 reviews and each agent must review
6–7 objects. In the data, each agent sorts the papers into 4 equivalence classes which
we gave utility values (5,3,1,0). We use the PAV inspired decreasing harmonic OWA
vector (1,1/2,1/3, . . .) to compute the Σ -OWA assignment.
One of the reasons we wanted to use the Σ -OWA assignment is to allow the market
designer to enforce a more equitable distribution of papers with respect to the ranks.
Hence, our test statistic is the number of top ranked items that the average agent can ex-
pect to receive. Figure 3 shows the agent counts and the cumulative distribution function
(CDF) for the number of top ranked items the agents receive.
Looking at the left side of the figure, we see that 71 agents receive 5 top ranked
papers under the Σ -OWA assignment while under the utilitarian assignment only 46 do.
Under the utilitarian assignment 35 agents receive more than 5 top ranked papers. Con-
sequently, on average, agents can expect to get 4 top ranked papers in the Σ -OWA as-
signment, 3 in the egalitarian assignment, and 4.2 in the utilitarian assignemnt. However
under the utilitarian assignment, several agents receive an entire set of top ranked ob-
jects, while the egalitarian assignment modulates this so that most agents only receive
3–4 top ranked items. In contrast, the Σ -OWA assignment is a balance between these
with the most agents receiving 5 top ranked items.
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Fig. 3. The count of agents receiving x top ranked papers (top) and the cumulative distribution
function (CDF) (bottom) for the number of agents being assigned x top ranked objects for MD-
00002-00000003. Though 100% of the agents receive between 1 and 5 top ranked items for the
egalitarian and Σ -OWA assignments (CDF), the PDF shows that the most agents receive the most
top ranked items under the Σ -OWA assignment.
7 Conclusions
We have proposed and provided algorithms for the novel notion of a Σ -OWA assign-
ment. The Σ -OWA assignment using decreasing OWA vectors gives the central orga-
nizer a “slider” to move from utility maximizing towards a more rank maximal assign-
ment computationally efficient package. An important open question for future work
is to find axiomatic characterizations for good OWA vectors. Additionally, the OWA
method, and all methods for CPAP that we surveyed, treat objects as having positive
utility. It is generally the case that reviewers at a conference want to review fewer, not
more, papers. Consequently it would be interesting to study CPAP from the point of
view of chores, as they are called in the economics literature.
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